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AERIAL SEARCHES OF BUSINESS
PREMISES: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
It is the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
which protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their...
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures."' Al-
though the amendment specifically refers to "houses," business
and commercial premises are likewise entitled to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Attempts to isolate
1. US. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause.
Id. The fourth amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). If evidence is
obtained as a result of a violation of the fourth amendment, it is the exclusionary rule
which calls for the suppression of this evidence. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
393-94 (1914). Moreover, under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, information
gathered in an illegal search that leads to the subsequent issuance of a search warrant will
render that warrant invalid. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
Historically, the protection the Framers of the Constitution sought through the fourth
amendment had its origin in "the abuses connected with the writs of assistance and general
warrants employed by British officials in the colonies prior to the American Revolution."
See Note, From. Private Places to Personal Prvacy. A Post- Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 969 (1968). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
624-30 (1886) (detailed description of abuses associated with general warrants and writs of
assistance). In the seminal English case of Entick v. Carrington. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.
1765), general warrants were described as so broad as to be incapable of justification; these
warrants would be issued as blanks under the authority of a magistrate, and the specifics
would then be filled out when the warrants were used. See Comment, Aerial Surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MAR. L Rav. 455, 459-60 (1984). The Supreme Court in
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), observed: "The particular offensiveness
[the general warrants] engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen
whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary
revenue measures that most irritated the colonists." Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311; accord Oli-
ver v. United States, - U.S.-----, -_ - 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 n.8 (1984). In addition,
the writs of assistance enabled customs officials to conduct broad searches for contraband
or smuggled goods with very little justification. See Comment, supra, at 460. See generally
Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observation in the Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Mis-
conception, 71 Dicy. L. Rev. 379, 414-15 (1967) (historical background of search and
seizure); Comment, supra, at 457-58 (origin and meaning of "to be secure").
2. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 564, 367 (1968); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615,
618 (W.D. N.Y. 1977); 1 W. LA FAVY, SEAiROc AND Sm uax § 2.4(b) (1978); LA FAVE AND
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violations of the fourth amendment must begin with the inquiry
of whether or not the conduct amounts to a "search." s The in-
quiry becomes more complex when the alleged search is not a
ground level intrusion,' but is perpetrated by the more advanced
method of aerial surveillance.' When the aerial vantage point as-
sumed by government officials is further aided by the use of so-
phisticated surveillance devices such as high resolution cameras,
the intrusive nature of aerial searches becomes more apparent.6
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's aerial surveillance and photography of the Dow
plant did not amount to a fourth amendment search.' This Article
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.2(e) (1984).
3. See Comment, supra note 1, at 474.
4. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 309-10 (1978) (inspection of work
area of factory); Wilson v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 620 F.2d 1201, 1207 (7th Cir. 1980)
(warrantless search of real property by health officials); wattenburg v. United States, 388
F.2d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1968) (warrantless search of lodge operator's premises); Sokolov
v. Village of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d 341, 343-44, 420 N.E.2d 55, 56, 438 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258
(1981) (warrantless search of landlord's property).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrantless
helicopter surveillance by Coast Guard of defendant's ranch), crt. denied, 454 U.S. 833
(1981); United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (D. Me. 1985) (aerial surveil-
lance of marijuana plot); United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 512-13 (E.D. Ky.
1980) (aerial surveillance of defendant's farm); People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081,
1085, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984) (aerial photography of marijuana plants), cert. granted,
- U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985); People v. Lashmett, 71 111. App. 3d 429, 430-31,
389 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1979) (aerial view of farm machinery), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980). The topic of aerial surveillance has received the attention of several commentators
as well. See, e.g., Note, Aerial Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAP.M L
REv. 271 (1981) (general discussion of intrusiveness of aerial surveillance) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Overlooking]; Note, Fourth Amendment Implications of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance,
17 VAL U.L. REv. 309 (1983) (examination of constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveil-
lance) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implications]; Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L Rav. 409 (1982) (constitutional analysis of warrantless aerial
surveillance in light of relevant case law) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Analysis];
Comment, Aerial Surveillance: A Plane View of the Fourth Amendment, 18 Goz L. Rzv. 307
(1982.83) (discussion of role of aerial surveillance in diminishing privacy); Comment, supra
note I (general discussion of use of aircraft to search property).
6. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. See generally Note, The EPA's Use of Aerial
Photography Violates the Fourth Amendment" Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 15 CONN. L
Rav. 327 (1983) (discussion of district court decision in Dow regarding EPA's use of aerial
photography) [hereinafter cited as Note, Aerial Photography; Note, Telescopes, Binoculars,
and the Fourth Amendment. 67 CoaRNu. L Rav. 379 (1982) (discussion of police use of
telescopes and binoculars to observe activity unobservable with naked eye) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Telescopes].
7. 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), cvi. granted, - U.S-..-., 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985).
8. Id. at 313.
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will discuss the aerial surveillance of business premises within the
context of the court's decision in Dow. In light of the case law that
has developed in the area of aerial searches,' it is suggested that
technologically-aided aerial surveillance of business premises con-
stitutes an unreasonable search which should be accorded full
fourth amendment protection. Hence, this Article will suggest
that the effectiveness of aerial surveillance as a law enforcement
tool notwithstanding, aerial searches of business premises should
defer to the safeguards of a warrant requirement. 1
I. THE DEVELOPING LAW
"Search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment has
been defined in a variety of ways.12 Traditionally, a search is de-
fined as "some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest,
a looking for or seeking out."" The Supreme Court, in Katz v.
United States,14 declared a more carefully reasoned principle for
determining violations of the fourth amendment. Justice Harlan,
in his concurring opinion, articulated what has become the most
frequently invoked standard for determining a fourth amendment
search: first, the person must have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' As a general
9. See supra note 5; se also infra note 70. See generally Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial
Surveillance Coansitutional,- 55 CAL ST. BJ. 451 (1980) (general discussion of warrantless
aerial surveillance). The vast majority of aerial surveillance cases have involved marijuana
fields. See, e.g., United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985); United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d
112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
10. See iafra notes 26-88 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
12. See I W. L FAvx, supra note 2, § 2.1(a); Comment, supra note 1, at 475; see also
Hale v. Henkel. 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (search implies "quest by an officer of the law").
13. 1 W. LA FAvE supra note 2. at 222 (citing 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)).
The traditional definition has been gleaned from cases which have stated that a search
implies some exploratory investigation, Smith v. United States, 2 F.2d 715, 716 (4th Cir.
1924); Russell v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 27, 30 (W.D. Va. 1971), or an invasion and quest,
United States v. Cook, 213 F. Supp. 568. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); State v. Quinn. 111 S.C.
174, 97 S.E. 62, 64 (1918), a looking for or seeking out, State v. Reagan, 328 S.W.2d 26,
28 (Mo. 1959); State v. Hawkins, 362 Mo. 152, 240 S.W.2d 688, 692 (1951).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). From the two pronged test articulated in Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion we get the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. See id
(Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, a seminal fourth amendment decision, the Court held that
Vol. 1: 94, 1985
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proposition, a search of private property will be construed as "un-
reasonable" if the search is not conducted pursuant to a valid
search warrant." The Supreme Court has extended this warrant
requirement to commercial premises as well, within the context of
an administrative entry.17 The Court has acknowledged that
"[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a consti-
tutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable offi-
cial entries upon his private commercial property."18
Recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the "open fields" excep-
tion to the fourth amendment.' That is, the Court upheld the
a person who had made a call from a public telephone booth was protected from electronic
eavesdropping on his conversation when the police had no warrant supported by probable
cause. Id. at 353.
In effect, the Court in Katz did away with the trespass doctrine in fourth amendment
analysis which made a physical penetration of the premises determinative. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); Note, Telescopes, supra note 6, at 380-82.
The court in United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980), recog-
nized that Katz compels a more sensitive reading of the fourth amendment. 493 F. Supp. at
1081. See also 1 W. LA FAVW, supra note 2, § 2.4(a), at 335 (Katz calls for more careful
reasoning).
16. E.g., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). It is important
to note the difference between a reasonable search and a reasonable expectation of privacy.
See Dow, 749 F.2d at 312; see also Note, Implications, supra note 5, at 319 ("A search and a
violation of the fourth amendment are not synonymous."). A reasonable search refers to
whether probable cause existed to conduct the search or whether the officials went beyond
the limits of the warrant. Dow, 749 F.2d at 312. A reasonable expectation of privacy, on
the other hand, helps determine whether there was a search in the first place. Id.
17. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967); f. Camara, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (warrantless inspection of personal residence unconstitutional). In See, a person re-
fused to allow a City of Seattle Fire Department representative to enter and inspect his
commercial warehouse without a warrant. See, 387 U.S. at 541. Upon his refusal, the
owner of the warehouse was arrested and charged with a violation of Seattle's Fire Code.
Id. The Court held:
[T]he basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment -
that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure is applicable in this
context, as in others, to business as well as to residential premises. Therefore, appel-
lant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the
fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellant's locked warehouse.
Id. at 546.
18. See, 387 U.S. at 543. By acknowledging the businessman's constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property, the See Court, it is submitted, is consistent with the protection the Framers of the
Constitution sought through the fourth amendment. See supra note 1.
19. See Oliver v. United States, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1737 (1984); accord
United States v. Hoskins, 735 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984). In Oliwr, two narcotics agents
went to Oliver's farm to investigate reports that he was growing marijuana. Oliver, -
U.S. at _ 104 S. Ct. at 1738. They drove past his house to a locked gate which had a
"No Trespassing" sign on it. Id. The agents used a footpath which led around one side of
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notion that "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy
for activities conducted out of doors in fields,"'0 except in the cur-
tilage - the area immediately surrounding the home.21 Conse-
the gate for several hundred yards. Id. Eventually they found a field of marijuana over a
mile from Oliver's home; he was ultimately arrested for manufacturing a controlled sub-
stance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(aX1) (1982). Id. Applying the second prong of the Katz test,
the Court concluded that an individual has "no legitimate expectation that open fields will
remain free from warrantless intrusion by government officers." Id. at 1742.
The Oliver decision reaffirms a notion that the Supreme Court articulated over sixty
years ago in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In a rather brief decision, the
Supreme Court held that the special protection accorded by the fourth amendment did not
extend to the open fields. Id. at 59; accord United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370 (1 Ith
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 2397 (1984); United States v. Basile, 569
F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978). Since the Hester decision, courts
have applied the open fields doctrine to almost every type of land which does not fall
within the curtilage - the area immediately surrounding the home. See, e.g., Care v.
United States, 231 F.2d 22. 24-25 (10th Cir.) (still found in cave located 125 yards from
house not accorded fourth amendment protection), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956); Con-
rad v. State, 63 Wis.2d 616, 621, 218 N.W.2d 252, 254 (1974) (search for body under rock
pile located 450 feet from house not accorded fourth amendment protection). See generally
I W. LA FAVE supra note 2, § 2.4(a), at 332 (general discussion of open fields). For a gen-
eral discussion of the curtilage concept see infra notes 21, 57-58 and accompanying text.
For a discussion and criticism of the Oliver decision, see Note, Oliver and the Open Fields
Doctrine, 7 C&,pw±L L Rxv. 253 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Note, Open Fields]; Note,
Fourth Amendment Protection Extends to a Landonner of a Field Where a Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy is Manifested by Substantial Measures Taken to Exclude the Public: Oliver v. United
States, 28 How. LJ. 313 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Fourth Amendment Protection];
Comment, Supreme Court's Treatment of Open Fields. A Comment on Oliver and Thornton, 12
FL. ST. U.L Rav. 637 (1984).
Fifty years after its decision in Hester, the Supreme Court reapplied the open fields doc-
trine in a case involving commercial premises. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974). In Air Pollution Variance Bd., an inspector of the Depart-
ment of Health entered the corporate respondent's outdoor premises without its knowl-
edge or consent in order to test the smoke emitted from the chimneys. Id. at 862-63. The
Court held that the fourth amendment does not extend to "sights seen in the 'open
fields'." Id. at 865. The inspector did not enter the respondent's plant or offices, but
merely "sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in the sky." Id. at
864-65.
20. Oliver, - U.S. at - 104 S. Ct. at 1741. See supra note 19.
21. Oliver, - U.S. at - 104 S. Ct. at 1741; see supra note 19. The common law
concept of curtilage is defined as "the inclosed space of ground and buildings immediately
surrounding a dwellinghouse." Bt.mx's LAW DscrmoNsv 346 (5th ed. 1979); sue Fullbright
v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir.), crat. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Rosen-
cranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d
22, 25 (10th Cir.), curt denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956). See generally Comment, supra note 19,
at 648-49 (virtual uniformity in application of curtilage criteria by courts); Comment, Curti-
lage or Open Fields? Oliver v. United States Gies Renwed Signfcance to the Concept of Curti-
lage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. Prrr. L Rav. 795, 813 (1985) (individual protected
in curtilage because of its intimate relationship with the home). But see Wattenburg v.
United States, 388 F.2d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 1968) (curtilage historically unrelated to fourth
amendment analysis). The court in Wattenburg announced that the curtilage test was "pred-
icated upon a common law concept which has no historical relevancy to the fourth amend-
Aerial Searches
quently, warrantless aerial surveillance also has been justified by
the application of this exception." It has been suggested, that in
light of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the
open fields doctrine no longer has any independent meaning.2
Moreover, the standard which emerges from spatial considera-
tions such as open fields and curtilage ignores the privacy that the
fourth amendment is tailored to protect.2
ment guaranty." 388 F.2d at 858. Instead, curtilage was discussed in connection with com-
mon law burglary. Id. at 858 n.5 (citing 4 W. BLAcsToNE, COMMENTARIES *225).
Recently, the curtilage concept came into play in an aerial surveillance case. See People v.
Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), crt granted, - U.S. -
105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985). In Ciraolo, the police received an anonymous tip that marijuana
plants were seen growing in defendant's backyard. A police officer first went to the house
on foot, but he was unable to see anything because of two fences which completely en-
closed the defendant's backyard. Id. at 1085, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The police officer then
flew over the property in an airplane in order to photograph what was enclosed by defend-
ant's fence. Id. The police officer managed to observe and photograph the marijuana
plants as the plane flew at an altitude of 1000 feet. On the basis of this information, the
police officer obtained a search warrant of defendant's home. The defendant's motion to
suppress the plants as evidence was denied, and he appealed. Id. Applying the common law
concept of curtilage together with the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, the
court held that the warrantless overflight constituted an unreasonable search. Id. at 1087-
90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 96-98. The court reasoned that the backyard was indeed part of the
curtilage, and the existence of the fences were objective manifestations of the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
22. People v. Lashmett, 71 III. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979). But see People v.
Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1087-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96-98.
23. See Wattenburg, 388 F.2d at 857; Note, Fourth Amendment Protections, supra note 19,
at 335; Note, How Open are Open Fields? United States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL L REv. 133,
163 (1982); Note, Implications, supra note 5, at 334-38; Comment, supra note 5, at 315.
It has been suggested that the Oliver decision may signal the demise of the Katz reasona-
ble expectation of privacy rule. See Note, Oliver v. United States: Good Fences Make Good
Open Fields, 11 J. CoNTmp. L 531, 545 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Good Fences];
Note, Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C.L Rrv. 549(1985). It is submitted that the courts should not encourage this trend away from the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy rule, since it would lead to anomalous results. See, e.g., Con-
rad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 623, 218 N.W.2d 252, 256 (1974) (reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine is in "contradistinction" to open fields doctrine). In Conrad, the police
entered defendant's field and dug fifteen holes until they found a body. While the majority
termed the search "outrageous," it upheld the refusal to suppress the evidence on "open
fields" grounds. Id. at 624, 218 N.W.2d at 256; see also United States v. DeBacker, 493
F.Supp. at 1080-81 (court rejects strict open fields application); I W. LA FAVE, supra note 2,
§ 2.4(a), at 333-34 (discussion of Conrad).
It is further suggested that a return to a strict application of the open fields doctrine
would also force the abstract determination of where the curtilage ends and an open field
begins. See Note, Confusing Views: Open View, Plain View, and Open Fields Doctrines in Tennes-
see, 14 MiM. ST. U.L. REv. 337, 373 (1984). See also Note, Open Fields, supra note 19, at 263
(Oliver Court failed to consider time lost by officers wondering how far curtilage extended
and where open field began).
24. See United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1058 (11 th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissent-
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II. THE Dow Case: A Recent Paradigm
The Dow Chemical Co. v. United Statess case is an important focal
point for a discussion of aerial searches of commercial premises.
The Dow case provides a combination of facts heretofore not con-
fronted by the courts." That is, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit had to decide whether technologically-
aided aerial observation of a commercial facility within the con-
text of an administrative inspection violated the fourth
amendment.2s
In Dow, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began an
investigation of one of Dow's plants to determine whether emis-
sions from two coal-burning power houses violated the federal air
quality standards established under the Clean Air Act."M After
having made an on-site inspection and after having received draw-
ings of the layout of the power houses and boilers, the EPA called
Dow to arrange a second inspection." When Dow discovered that
the EPA inspectors planned to take photographs of the plant,
Dow refused to grant entry. Without securing a warrant, the EPA
hired an aerial survey corporation to take aerial photographs of
the Dow plant."M Equipped with a high-precision camera,"' the pi-
lot made at least six passes over the plant and took approximately
ing), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978); supra note 1. "[Ulnder Katz .... the Fourth
Amendment inquiry is not about geography, but about the state of mind of the person
asserting the Fourth Amendment claim and the reasonableness of that person's expectation
of privacy in respect of the area or thing searched." Basile, 569 F.2d at 1058 (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting).
25. 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984). est. granted, - U.S. - 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985).
26. See Comment, supra note 1. at 489; infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. The
district court decision in Dow, has been described as "the first high-tech aerial surveillance
case to be reported." Comment, supra note 1. at 489.
27. See Dow, 749 F.2d at 311.
28. Id. at 309-10.
29. Id. at 310.
30. Id. The purposes the EPA stated for the aerial surveillance were to create visual
documentation of emissions and to get a perspective of the layout of the plant and its
geographic relationship to the surrounding area. Id. The EPA also indicated to the aerial
survey corporation the specific altitudes and angles at which to take the pictures. Id.
31. Id. In Dow the pilot used a Wild RC-10 aerial mapping camera for the survey. Id.
The district court in Dow. 536 F. Supp. 1555 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, - U.S. - 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985). indicated that the camera
used cost over $22,000 and "is described by the company as the 'finest precision aerial
camera available.'" Id. at 1357 (citing HANwsoox oN AERtAL SURVEYS AND PHOOOGRAmmE-
TRY-ABRAMS AERIAL SURVEY CORPORATION).
Vol. 1: 94, 1985
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seventy-five color pictures of the facility."2 In reversing the district
court's ruling that the EPA's detailed photography constituted an
unreasonable search under the fourth amendment," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that
Dow had no reasonable expectation of privacy that merited fourth
amendment protection."
A. Minding One's Business: An Analysis of the Dow Case
The Dow court properly began its inquiry by recognizing that
the Katz test"5 should be used to determine whether the EPA's
conduct constituted a search." In applying the first prong of the
test (whether Dow had exhibited an actual expectation of privacy),
the court observed that "Dow took great pains to be free from
ground level intrusions by building a perimeter security fence and
employing security guards. '3 7 Though Dow had implemented
elaborate and expensive security measures," the court concluded
that having taken no measure for aerial security, Dow had no ac-
tual expectation of privacy from the air." The court reached this
*conclusion by searching for two elements it said were necessary to
establish an actual expectation of privacy. The Dow court rea-
soned that it must be established first, what the person had an
expectation of privacy in, and second, what the person wanted to
32. Dow, 749 F.2d at 310. The plane made at least six passes over the plant at 12,000,
3,000, and 1,200 feet. Id. The pictures contained high resolution and detail and when
enlarged and viewed under magnification, the pictures showed equipment and power lines
as small as one-half inch in diameter. Id.
33. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
34. Dw, 749 F.2d at 313.
35. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
36. Dow, 749 F.2d at 311.
37. Id. at 312.
38. Id. The district court in Dow catalogued fifteen measures that Dow implemented in
an attempt to exhibit its expectation of privacy, 536 F. Supp. at 1364-65, including a re-
quirement that cameras at all times and in all places in the facility were prohibited by
anyone other than an authorized representative of Dow. Id. at 1365. Dow also required
any person visiting for technical reasons to get a technical pass which provided that the
visitor would not divulge any technical information learned as a result of the visit. Id.
39. Dow, 749 F.2d at 312-13. The court suggested that Dow could have shielded the
observed area between the buildings in order to be free from aerial observation. See id. But
see infra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d
112, 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1974). The Dean court aptly observed: "Expectations of
privacy are not earthbound. The Fourth Amendment guards the privacy of human activity
from aerial no less than terrestial invasion." Id. at 116, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
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protect his privacy from.' The court concluded that Dow's secur-
ity measures' 1 indicated that it had an actual expectation of pri-
vacy in certain parts of its plant;"* Dow's objective behavior, the
court opined, indicated no expectation to be free from aerial ob-
servers.' It is submitted that the second element," namely, what
the person wanted to protect his privacy from, loses sight of an
important proposition found in Katz: "what a [person] seeks to
preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." 5 It is clear that Dow took every pre-
caution to shield itself from every conceivable form of ground
level intrusion,' thus asserting a privacy interest which courts
should carefully consider" if the fourth amendment is to enjoy
continued vitality." Leaving one's privacy at the mercy of the
state of the art available to officials will invariably "set up a con-
test between government and private citizen to test which party
can outmaneuver the other in a game of hide and seek." 49 Clearly,
40. Dow, 749 F.2d at 312. The Dow court suggested that a person may have an expecta-
tion of privacy in, for example, a home, office, phone booth or airplane. Id. The court also
stated that it must be established what the person sought to protect his privacy from, for
example, non-employees of a firm. Id.
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. Dow, 749 F.2d at 312. The court stated that Dow had an expectation of privacy in
certain parts of its plant to be free from ground level intrusions. Id.
43. Id.
44. It is suggested that the first element is not problematic since having to establish an
expectation in something is comparable to having to exhibit your actual expectation of
privacy within the meaning of the first prong in Ka. See supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. See generally Note, Constitutional Analysis, supra note 5, at 431-32 (shielding one's
property from every view except aerial view should be given substantial consideration);
Comment, supra note 1, at 483 (requiring complete enclosure is unreasonable under fourth
amendment analysis).
48. See gentrally Mascolo, supra note 1, at 428 (concept of search must be broadly con-
ceived); Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment" A Reasonable Expectation of Priva or, A Man's
Home is His Fort, 23 Cszv. ST. L REv. 63, 87 (1974) (fourth amendment rights should be
liberally construed).
49. United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 792 (E.D. Cal. 1985); see Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MIN. L REV. 349, 402 (1974). The court in
People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1984), described the problem
best:
If limitations on privacy can be technologically leaped, as by the use of aircraft to
lift the state's gaze above a restrictive fence, the extent of one's privacy is no greater
than the sophistication of equipment possessed by the state. If privacy is left at the
mercy of technology the Fourth Amendment will soon be moribund.
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this is not the aim of the fourth amendment."
In addition to the actual expectation of privacy that one exhib-
its in certain premises, the second prong of the Katz test, which
requires that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable,81 must also be satisfied.53 Having taken
into account Dow's size and location, the court concluded that it
was not reasonable for Dow to expect privacy in the observed re-
gions of the plant.6 The court refused to apply the curtilage doc-
trine to a commercial setting," reasoning that Dow's privacy in-
terest in its plant is not equal to the privacy interest associated
with a dwelling." It is submitted, however, that in light of the
200 Cal. Rptr. at 835. See also Dean, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (fourth
amendment needs constant accommodation to intensifying technology); Note, supra note
48, at 72. One commentator observed:
Thus we have the specter of a fourth amendment which protects any man who
retreats into his home to be free from unreasonable intrusion. Any man, that is, who
is wealthy enough to afford a windowless, soundproof house, built on an extensive
area of land, and surrounded by high fences, and a man who is willing to live the life
of a hermit, staying inside his house at all times, prepared to take affirmative action
to counter any new technological methods of intrusion with which the government
might be equipped.
Note, supra note 48, at 72; see Note, Good Fences, supra note 23, at 544 (with every new
advance in technology would come a reduction in privacy).
50. See supra note 1; see also Note, supra note 48, at 72 (fourth amendment does not
require one to live life in a fort).
51. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally I W. LA FAVE, supra
note 2, § 2.1(a), at 230-31 (general discussion of second prong of Katz test).
52. See I W. LA FAVE, supra note 2, § 2.1(d); Comment, supra note 1, at 470-71.
53. Dow, 749 F.2d at 313. The court noted that Dow's plant covered 2000 acres and
was located in an urban area near an airport. Thus, the court compared the Dow plant to
open fields. Id.
54. Id. at 314. For a general discussion of the curtilage concept see supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
55. Dow, 749 F.2d at 314. In arguing that Dow's expectation of privacy was unreasona-
ble, the court alluded to a statement made in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99
(1981), concerning a commercial owner's privacy interest in his property. See Dow, 749
F.2d at 314. The Supreme Court in Donovan opined that the "expectation of privacy that
the owner of commercial premises enjoys in that property differs significantly from the
sanctity accorded an individual's home." 452 U.S. at 598-99. It is suggested, however, that
this observation does not emasculate the proposition that Dow's expectation of privacy in
the observed areas of the plant was reasonable. The Court in Donovan was attempting to
explain that there are some instances where the owner of commercial premises should not
reasonably expect privacy. Id. If, for example, he is operating within an industry which is
highly regulated, his expectation might be unreasonable. See infra notes 74-76 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, the Donovan Court went on to acknowledge the fact that inspec-
tions of commercial property may be unreasonable "if they are not authorized by law or
are unnecessary for the furtherance of federal interests." 452 U.S. at 599. In order to
further support its opinion that Dow's expectation of privacy in the interior of its buildings
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Supreme Court's recognition that fourth amendment protections
should be extended to commercial buildings," the businessman
should be entitled to constitutional protection in the area immedi-
ately surrounding his building if adequate measures were taken to
be free from public intrusion.5 While a perfunctory application of
geographic concepts is not suggested, the protection afforded the
"curtilage" of business premises shouldbe justified by reference
to the businessman's legitimate expectation of privacy in that area
as defined in Katz." Once an area has been deemed part of the
curtilage," courts have extended fourth amendment protection
by concluding that the landowner may reasonably expect privacy
is different from that which inheres in a dwelling, the Dow court relied on the fact that a
lesser showing of probable cause is required to secure an administrative warrant than is
required to secure a criminal warrant. Dow, 749 F.2d at 314. The probable cause needed to
obtain an administrative warrant was first described in Camara. See Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. at 538. Thereafter, the Supreme Court interpreted that requirement in Marshall.
See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. at 320. The Marshall Court posited:
Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an ad-
ministrative search .. .probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing
that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an.. .inspec-
tion are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'
Id. (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 538).
It is suggested that while a lesser showing of probable cause is required to secure an
administrative warrant, this is not indicative of a less intense privacy interest. Rather, it is
suggested that the lesser showing of probable cause considers the "less hostile intrusion"
involved in an administrative inspection as compared with a police officer's search for evi-
dence of a crime. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530; McManis and McManis, Structuring Adminis-
tratim Inspetiont" Is There Any Warrant for a Search Warrant?, 26 AiL U. L Rav. 942, 964
(1977). See generally La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment. The Camara
and See Cases, 1967 Sup. Or. Rav. 1, 11-20 (general discussion of whether right to inspect
should arise only upon existence of probable cause).
56. Sue G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977); Sm, 387 U.S. 541
(1967); Comment, supra note 21, at 814.
57. Sue Comment, supra note 21, at 814-15 (curtilage includes area immediately sur-
rounding any building entitled to fourth amendment protection);, s also United States v.
Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 1984). The Marbury court indicated the possibility of
a curtilage within the context of commercial property when it described the effected prop-
erty as "the plainly noncurtilage portions of this large tract." 732 F.2d at 398 (regarding
large commercial gravel pit).
58. See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (agent's
entry onto commercial premises surrounded by eight foot fence with barbed wire a search).
See I W. LA FAV., supra note 2, § 2.4(b), at 342. Prof. La Fave observes: [M)echanical
application of the curtilage concept so as to deprive business lands of any Fourth Amend-
ment protection is inappropriate after Ka. The question now is whether the police in-
truded upon a justified expectation of privacy." 1 W. LA FAvm, supra note 2, 4 2.4(b), at
342; Comment, supra note 21, at 815.
59. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 21, at 818 n. 119.
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in that area.1
Whether one's expectation of privacy is reasonable should also
depend on the technology used by officials to aid the observa-
tion."1 The Dow court mitigated the effect of the EPA's use of so-
phisticated photographic equipment from the air, since it had al-
ready concluded that Dow had no legitimate privacy interest in
the observed area." It has been held, however, that the use of
aids to view that which would not have been observable by the
naked eye violates a reasonable expectation of privacy." In Dow,
the high-precision camera used captured images which could later
be analyzed under magnified conditions." Consequently, "the
camera saw a great deal more than the human eye could ever
see."85 Focusing on the reasonableness of this conduct, the district
court in Dow observed: "In this age of ever-advancing and poten-
tially unlimited technology the government should be made aware
that it does not possess carte blanche authority to utilize sophisti-
cated surveillance methods to keep watch over citizens or busi-
60. See People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97-98,
cert. granted, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976) (FBI agents used
800 millimeter telescope with a 60 millimeter opening); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d
505, 155 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979) (police officer used 10-power binoculars). See also 1 W. LA
FAVE, supra note 2, § 2.2(c), at 259; Granberg, supra note 9, at 452; Note, Aerial Photogra-
phy, supra note 6, at 342; Note, Overlooking, supra note 5, at 289; Note, Constitutional Analy-
.is, supra note 5, at 436-37; Comment, supra note 5, at 326.
62. Dow, 749 F.2d at 314-15.
63. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976); Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 624 (1979); see also United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980)
(enhanced viewing of interior of home violates expectation of privacy). See generally Note,
Telescopes, supra note 6, at 386-88 (general discussion of Arno, Kim, and Taborda). But see
United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1982) (observation by binoculars not pro-
scribed where defendant had otherwise exposed himself to public view); Commonwealth v.
Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, _ , 263 A.2d 904, 906 (1970) (police officer's use of binoc-
ulars to view illegal manufacture of gambling sheets not unreasonable search), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 914 (1971).
64. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1367; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
65. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1367. The district court in Dow observed that when flying at
the levels at which the plane flew "the eye can only discern only the basic sizes, shapes and
outlines and colors of the objects below." Id. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 489.
In relation to the Dow case one commentator has observed: "Photographic searches...
have now reached the point where photographs are taken of suspect property, then en-
largements of those photographs may be 'searched' in detail. The technological efficiency
of this method makes it the most intrusive form of aerial search." Comment, supra note I.
at 489.
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nesses not suspected of any criminal activity."" It is submitted,
therefore, that commercial privacy includes protection from unan-
ticipated methods of surveillance, and this expectation of privacy
should be considered reasonable by society.'
Another factor the Dow court mentioned, indicating that Dow's
expectation of privacy was unreasonable, was the location of the
Dow plant. The court observed that Dow had taken no precau-
tions against aerial intrusions even though the facility was located
near an airport and within the landing and taking off pattern of
the planes." On this point, it is submitted that the court mistak-
enly equates routine aerial flight with the intensive aerial surveil-
lance conducted by the EPA.' The possibility of casual observa-
tion by the public should not allow government officials to
conduct directed surveillance activities as the EPA did in Dow.70
66. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1368. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Dissenting in White, Justice Douglas observed:
Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known. How
most forms of it can be held 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment is a mystery. To be sure, the Constitution and Bill of Rights are not to be read
as covering only the technology known in the 18th century. Otherwise its concept of
.commerce' would be hopeless when it comes to the management of modern affairs
at the same time the concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful gov-
ernment, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign purposes, to pene-
trate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them from the pressures of a
turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to carry on.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1366-67; cf. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. Inc. v. Christo-
pher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). In the context of
aerial photography used to discover trade secrets, the duPont court acknowledged the im-
portance of protecting commercial privacy from unanticipated methods of surveillance:
"Commercial privacy must be protected from espionage which could not have been reason-
ably anticipated or prevented.. . . [W]e need not require the discoverer of a trade secret
to guard against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable methods of es-
pionage now available." duPont, 431 F.2d at 1016; see also Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 512,
153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 628 (1979) (police officer's use of 10-power binoculars to see activities
in office building too intrusive).
68. Dow, 749 F.2d at 312.
69. See Note, Aerial Photography, supra note 6, at 342.
70. See United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 794 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Agee, 200
Cal. Rptr. at 836. The court in Agee reasoned: "The chilling effect on privacy of the obser-
vation of behavior by public authorities is categorically different in kind from the casual
visibility of the protected area by some limited segment of the public." Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr.
at 836; cf Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315 (the fact that employees could observe certain activi-
ties did not justify warrantless entry by government officials); Wilson v. Health & Hosp.
Corp., 620 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1980) (fact that members of public could have discovered
violations by trespassing on property did not legitimize invalid search).
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While complete privacy is not possible if there is a possibility that
the public will fly over, it is only a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy that is required.7 ' As one commentator observed: "The ex-
pectation need only be reasonable; it need not be unassailable." 7'
It is submitted that the law of administrative searches is instruc-
tive in determining the reasonableness of Dow's manifested expec-
tation of privacy. From the general rule that search warrants are
required to conduct administrative inspections,7" exceptions have
been carved out for "pervasively regulated" 7' industries "long
subject to close supervision.""' This exception is based on a the-
Several writers and commentators have noted the difference between casual observation
and directed surveillance. See LA FAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note .2, § 3.2, at 172; Mascolo,
supra note 1, at 419; Note, Implicationw, supra note 5, at 315; Comment, supra note 1, at
473. See generally Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 145 (1973) (heli-
copter surveillance should be eliminated from residential areas).
Courts have relied on different factors when allowing the aerial surveillance. The height
of the aircraft is one factor. See, e.g., United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1331
(D. Me. 1985) (airplane at 1000 feet considered brief surveillance); United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (plane at 50 feet considered reason-
able); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, -, 277 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1981) (plane at
"lawful height" negated defendant's expectation of privacy); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii
412, -, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328-29 (1977) (plane at 300 feet reasonable). But see People v.
Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 542, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (1973) (helicopter at 20-25 feet
was manifestly exploratory in nature); Note, Constitutional Analysis, supra note 5, at 425-26
(altitude of surveillance standard inapplicable in light of Katz).
Another factor courts have considered when allowing aerial surveillance is the frequency
of the flights over the property. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th
Cir. 1980) (Coast Guard helicopters routinely crossed airspace), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833
(1981); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (airplane
flights over local farm land not infrequent); People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal.
App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974) (police helicopter patrol part of protec-
tion afforded citizens of Los Angeles).
71. See Note, Katz in Open Fields: United States v. Oliver, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 485
(1983); Note, Open Fields, supra note 19, at 494.
72. Note, supra note 71, at 494.
73. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
74. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). In Biswell, the respondent was
licensed to deal in sporting weapons; a federal agent sought entry into a locked gun store-
room in order to inspect firearms pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968. Id. at 311-12.
When the agent went into the storeroom he found two sawed-off rifles which the owner
was not licensed to possess. id. at 312. The warrantless search of business premises under
the Gun Control Act of 1968 was challenged as unconstitutional under the fourth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court held that close scrutiny of firearms traffic was "of central im-
portance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the
firearms traffic within their borders." Id. at 315. Therefore, the Court held, when a dealer
opts to participate in a "pervasively regulated" business and when the inspections advance
important federal interests, the inspection may be conducted without a warrant. Id. at 316-
17.
75. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). In Colonnade,
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ory of consent which suggests that those businesses "entering a
heavily regulated field do so with the knowledge that their estab-
lishments may be subject to warrantless searches." 76 Recently the
Court reaffirmed this notion by declaring that "warrantless in-
spections of commercial property may be constitutionally objec-
tionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent or unpredict-
able that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real
expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected
by government officials.""7
In Dow, the EPA officials were attempting to determine whether
emissions coming from the plant violated air quality standards
under the Clean Air Act (the Act).7 The EPA's authority to regu-
late the chemical industry is not "pervasive"'" as compared with
the government's control over the alcohol," firearms,6 ' and min-
ing" industries. The Act, in particular, provides for the regula-
tion of a "broad, heterogeneous class of industries."" Since the
the petitioner was authorized to serve liquor in his catering establishment. Suspecting a
violation of the federal excise tax law, a federal agent asked that the manager unlock the
liquor storeroom in order to inspect it pursuant to 26 U.S.C. I 5146(b) (1980). Id. at 72-
73. The owner of the establishment brought suit to obtain the seized liquor and to sup-
press it as evidence. Id. at 72. The Court observed:
We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and inspec-
tion. As respects that industry ...Congress has broad authority to fashion stan-
dards of reasonableness for searches and seizures... . It resolved the issue [under
the existing statutes] not by authorizing forcible, warrantless entries, but by making
it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission to the inspector.
Id. at 77. More recently, the Supreme Court decided that warrantless inspections required
by the Mine Safety and Health Act did not violate the fourth amendment. See Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599-605 (1981). The Supreme Court in Donovan noted that the
Colonnade-Bismell exception does not require a long history of regulation; rather, it is the
pervasiveness and regularity of the federal scheme that determines whether a warrant is
necessary. Id. at 606.
76. Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 1983);
see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973); Biwel, 406 U.S. at 316;
Dow, 749 F.2d at 311 n. 1; Martin, EPA and Administrative Inspection, 7 F.A. ST. U.L REv.
123, 130-31 (1979).
77. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599.
78. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7620; see Dow, 749 F.2d at 310.
79. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1361.
80. Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 72-74; see supra note 75.
81. Binwell, 406 U.S. at 311-12; see supra note 74.
82. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 596-97; see supra note 75.
83. Note, FDA, EPA, OSHA Inspections-Practical Considerations in Light of Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 39 MD. L. Rav. 715, 729 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(aX2), (aX3), (bXI)
(Supp. 11 1978). The Clean Air Act's wide coverage is indicated in the EPA's authority to
set standards for "'any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit
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Act covers a host of different industries there is no definitive his-
tory of pervasive regulation for all the businesses that fall within
the Act's purview. 4 One commentator has correctly observed that
even if the nature of the regulatees under the Act did not pro-
scribe warrantless searches, the language of the statute does."
That is, the Act provides that the EPA must either obtain a com-
pliance order or bring a civil action if anyone refuses an inspec-
tion.86 The Supreme Court has acknowledged this limitation on
the EPA's power to conduct warrantless inspections, albeit in an-
other context.8 7 It has been held that the pervasiveness of past
regulation affects a proprietor's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. 8 Having concluded that Dow was not operating within a
pervasively regulated industry, it is submitted that this further es-
any air pollutant' that is constructed or modified after the promulgation of the EPA stan-
dards." Note, supra, at 729 n.92 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 741 l(aX2). (aX3). (bXl) (Supp. II
1978)).
84. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1361-62; see Martin, supra note 76, at 730-31; Note, supra
note 83, at 729. The district court in Dow likened the EPA's power to regulate entities such
as Dow to the power the Department of Labor has under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970) (OSHA). Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1360-61; see Martin,
supra note 76, at 130-31. But see Comment, OSHA v. The Fourth Amendment. Should Search
Warrants be Required for "Spot Check" Inspections?, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 283, 307 (1977)
(EPA's inspection powers might be nearer to meeting "pervasive regulation" than OSHA)
(written before Marshall decision). The seminal case involving OSHA, and the case upon
which the district court in Dow relied is Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In
Marshall, the Supreme Court dealt with section 8(a) of the Act which granted the Secretary
of Labor the power to search the work area of any employment facility within the Act's
purview in order to look for safety hazards and violations of OSHA. Marshall, 436 U.S. at
309. An OSHA inspector entered Barlow's, Inc. and told Barlow he wanted to search the
working area of his business. The inspector had no search warrant, so Barlow refused to
admit him, relying on his fourth amendment rights. Id. at 310. The Secretary of Labor
sought and received an order to compel Barlow to admit the inspector. Barlow again re-
fused and sought an injunction against the warrantless searches. Id. The Court held that
OSHA inspections without a warrant violated the fourth amendment. Id. at 324. The
Court noted that the Colonnade exception for industries "long subject to close supervision"
did not apply because the business was involved in interstate commerce. Id. at 313-14.
85. Note, supra note 83, at 729; see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(aX3) (1980).
87. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 321-22 n.18. Albeit in the context of an OSHA inspec-
tion, the Marshall Court stated:
Another example [of a statute which envisions judicial enforcement] is the Clean Air
Act, which grants federal district courts jurisdiction 'to require compliance' with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency's attempt to inspect under
42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1976 ed., Supp. I), when the Administrator has commenced a
'civil action' for injunctive relief or to recover a penalty.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7413(bX4) (1976 ed., Supp. I)).
88. Bionic Auto Parts, 721 F.2d at 1079.
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tablishes Dow's expectation of privacy as reasonable.
B. Balancing The Competing Interests
The ultimate consideration in cases involving aerial observation
comes down to a balancing process between law enforcement in-
terests-and the privacy rights of citizens." Searches which are not
conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant are per se unreasona-
ble under the fourth amendment." Whether in the context of ad-
ministrative searches or not, a warrant provides assurance from a
neutral magistrate that the inspection is reasonable. 1 With the
potential for abuse that warrantless aerial searches provide, offi-
cials should not be permitted to do from the air what they would
not be permitted to do on the ground." On the facts of the Dow
case, it is submitted that any inconvenience which would have re-
sulted from requiring the EPA to obtain a warrant before con-
ducting its investigation would have been no greater than the ef-
fort it took to hire an aerial survey corporation." Moreover, the
language of the Clean Air Act itself already contemplates resort-
ing to judicial enforcement when entry is refused." Since fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
is so paramount, intrusive practices such as warrantless aerial sur-
veillance of commercial premises should be prevented where law
enforcement objectives would not be compromised if a warrant
89. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37; Broadhurt, 612 F. Supp. at 794-95; 3 W. LA FAvz,
supra note 2, § 10.1(c), at 192; Note, Implications, supra note 5, at 310; Comment, supra
note 1. at 480.
90. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
91. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323; Rothstein and Rothstein, Administratim Searches snd
Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L REv. 341, 350 (1975).
92. Ag , 200 Cal. Rptr. at 835; see also Mascolo, supra note 1, at 428. "IThe Fourth
Amendment did not merely protect against actual searches, but also against other proce-
dures of figurative searches, which sought to accomplish the objects of a search without
affording the constitutional safeguards surrounding it." Mascolo, supra note 1, at 428 (cit-
ing LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CoURT: A STUDY IN CONSTIrUrONAL
INTERPRETATION 52-53 (1966)). "It is inconceivable that the fourth amendment would pro-
hibit arbitrary governmental intrusions in one form, only to allow the very same abuse to
take place in another form." Note, supra note 48, at 87. Searches by aircraft are offensive
to the fourth amendment because police are able to "observe objects not viewable in the
absence of a physical invasion of property." Comment, supra note 1, at 482.
93. See text accompanying note 30.
94. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text; 3 W. LA FAvE, supra note 2, § 10.2,
at 234-35; Martin, supra note 76, at 736-37.
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were required.' 5
III. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL PREMISES
Drawing on the Dow case as a suitable paradigm, several factors
applicable to all commercial premises may be gleaned from the
case. When a warrantless aerial surveillance of business premises
has been conducted, an application of the Katz two-prong test to
determine whether the conduct amounted to a search is appropri-
ate." The first prong should be analyzed in light of the business-
man's attempts to shield the observed area from public view."
Since all lands are susceptible to casual aerial observation, requir-
ing a businessman to build the functional equivalent of an
"opaque bubble" over his premises is misguided." The second
prong, which focuses on the reasonableness of the manifested ex-
pectation of privacy," should involve a close look at how the ae-
rial surveillance was conducted. 1"0 First, if the area observed im-
mediately surrounds the commercial building and adequate
measures were taken to exclude the public 0 1 fourth amendment
protection should be extended, since landowners may reasonably
expect privacy in those areas. Second, any technology used to aid
95. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Dissenting in Brinegar, Justice Jackson observed:
[Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere second class rights but belong
in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among [the] deprivations of rights, none is
so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror into every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
It is submitted that simply because it would be more burdensome to get a warrant first is
no justification for warrantless aerial surveillance. Cf. People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 82,
315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1974). The Spinelli court noted:
We do a great disservice to the highly professional and efficient law enforcement
officials of this state to determine that they cannot perform their job effectively with-
out impinging upon a very important constitutional right. Duties of law enforcement
officials are extremely demanding in a free society. But that is as it should be. A
policeman's job is easy only in a police state.
Id. at 82, 315 N.E.2d at 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
96. See text accompanying note 15.
97. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
98. Set Allen, 675 F.2d at 1380.
99. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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the observation must be scrutinized'02 since the "lengths to which
the police must go serve to define and confirm the reasonableness
of the expectation." 103 Third, it must be determined whether the
business premises are located clearly within the area where rou-
tine airflight is conducted for law enforcement purposes.10 If the
airflight that occurs over the commercial property is that to which
we are all susceptible, the businessman's manifested expectation of
privacy should be deemed reasonable.1" Finally, if the inspection
was conducted in order to monitor compliance with a particular
administrative regulation, the pervasiveness of that particular in-
dustry's regulatory scheme should help determine the reasonable-
ness of the businessman's expectation of privacy. 1"
IV. CONCLUSION
Having been afforded jealously guarded fourth amendment
rights, the owner of commercial premises should not be made to
tolerate greater and more varied methods of intrusion. The spirit
of the fourth amendment clearly contemplates the protection of
businesses'" and so a proprietor's privacy interest should be safe-
guarded accordingly.
Nancy Cifone
102. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
103. Note, Overlooking, supra note 5, at 289.
104. Cf. Allen, 675 F.2d at 1377 (Coast Guard routinely crossed airspace); People v.
Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974) (police
helicopter patrol part of protection afforded citizens of Los Angeles).
105. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 1.
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